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Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: 
A Forgotten Perspective For Reconsideration 
During the Rise of Finance 
Fenner Stewart, Jr.† 
It is not surprising that a one-dimensional model of the past, such as 
the “shareholder as owner,” is inadequate today and can result in a 
disjunction between law and reality.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s marked an American revolution in corporate governance 
as managers shifted their focus toward greater market accountability. By 
the late 1980s, the resulting efficiency gains placed the firm in a com-
petitive position to dominate within an increasingly global marketplace. 
The firm no longer looked like the tired and bloated conglomerate of the 
1960s; it had shed its skin and transformed itself into a glistening profit-
maker designed to entice the interest of the emerging class of global in-
vestors. 
Although a collection of academics created the theoretic ground-
work that inspired this heroic rebirth of the American firm, Henry Manne 
deserves much of the credit. Manne’s success can be attributed, at least 
in part, to how he redefined the interests of shareholders by “flipping”2 
Adolf A. Berle’s “shareholder primacy” argument.3 For the Berle of the 
† University of British Columbia, LL.M; University of British Columbia, LL.B; University of Prince 
Edward Island, B.A.; Ph.D. Candidate (Osgoode Hall Law School). Visiting Scholar, Columbia Law 
School. Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Peer Zumbansen, Jennifer 
Hill, John Cioffi, Charles O’Kelley, and William Bratton for their comments on this Article. 
1. Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 78 (2000).
2. A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like Berle advocat-
ing shareholder primacy to open the corporation to public-interest concerns) and then that same 
language is used to endorse the opposed reform (like Manne advocating shareholder primacy to 
close the corporation to public-interest concerns). For more on how arguments can be flipped, see 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1998); see also Kerry Rittich, 
Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Go-
vernance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853, 857 (2005). 
3. For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of 
Share Voting—An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964) [hereinafter 
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1920s and 1930s, shareholders were the middle- and working-class “Eve-
ryman.”4 Berle believed that if shareholder primacy was ensured, it 
would correct the democratic deficit that existed in the management of 
the American economy. For Manne of the 1960s, shareholders were 
much different; they were rational actors whose constructed intentions 
could be used to ascertain and justify market function.5 While Berle be-
lieved that the democratization of the shareholder class would make the 
corporation a tool for the wider polity, Manne used shareholder primacy 
to focus managerial efforts on economic efficiency. When Manne’s 
thoughts on shareholder primacy were married with those of Ronald 
Coase’s on transaction cost theory,6 what emerged was a powerful recon-
ceptualization of the corporation in legal thought.7 With the success of 
Manne’s perspective, the shareholder wealth maximization norm was 
born, firmly defining the interest of shareholders and planting the seeds 
for the financialization of the firm.8 
Today, Berle is celebrated as the grandfather of modern shareholder 
primacy,9 but this description glosses over his opposition to Manne’s flip 
Manne 1964]; Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 399 (1962) [hereinafter Manne 1962]; Henry G. Manne, Corporate Responsibility, Business 
Motivation, and Reality, 343 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55 (1962); Henry G. Manne, 
Current Views on the “Modern Corporation,” 38 U. DET. L.J. 559 (1961); Henry G. Manne, Ac-
counting for Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 285 (1959). 
4. “Everyman” is a reference to The Summoning of Everyman, usually referred to simply as
Everyman, written in the late fifteenth century. See ANONYMOUS, THE SUMMONING OF EVERYMAN 
(BiblioBazaar 2009) (15th cent.). The term may not be altogether the best term to use because there 
was a large population of female investors at the time. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate 
Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1257 n.39 (2010). 
5. The aggregate, private, contractual theory of the corporation that Manne endorsed was later
employed by Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, and William Meckling in a man-
ner that allowed theorists to use the sum of the constructed motives of economic actors to explain 
why organizations (like corporations) and institutions (like the market) functioned as they did. See 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 
62 AM. ECON. REV 777 (1972); see also Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10, 319 
(1976). 
6. R. H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
7. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2–5
(2005). See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 5; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5. 
8. Financialization of the corporation occurred when the understanding of the corporation
successfully endeavored to narrow the understanding of all social relationships within the corpora-
tion so that their value can be translated into an exchangeable instrument, which makes it possible 
for the financial industry to assess value to them and trade them. See generally Simon Deakin, The 
Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop It?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
67 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organi-
zation, Finance, Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility, CLPE Research Paper No. 6/2009, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971. 
9. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (2008). 
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of his argument.10 Berle’s objection is not always appreciated in com-
mentaries of his shareholder primacy argument. For this reason, this Ar-
ticle offers a nuanced understanding of Berle’s argument, providing a 
clear observation point for examining the shift from his shareholder pri-
macy argument to the one of today. This shift is a transition from pro-
moting shareholder primacy in order to protect minority constituents to 
promoting shareholder primacy in order to protect majority rights and the 
right of exit for any disgruntled minority.11 It is also the shift from pro-
moting shareholder primacy in order to tie corporate managers to public 
interest to promoting shareholder primacy in order to endorse minimiz-
ing transaction costs—even when efficacy gains unfortunately result in 
costs being externalized upon people who did not ex ante negotiate con-
tract safeguards to protect themselves against such risk.12 From this point 
of observation, the shareholder primacy argument offers another perspec-
tive upon investor empowerment during the current “rise of finance.”13 
Part II briefly reviews the history of Berle as a young man. It then 
introduces Berle’s theory of the corporation and how this theory plays 
out in his early endorsement of shareholder primacy from 1923 to 1926. 
Part III explores the development and content of The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property, with particular emphasis on the relationship 
between the book and the Berle–Dodd debate. Part IV provides a fresh 
analysis of the debate. Part V contextualizes Berle’s thoughts on share-
holder primacy within the rise of finance as an organizing force not only 
for the firm, but also for the rest of society. Finally, Part VI offers a con-
cluding thought. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE: 1923–1926
A. Berle as a Young Man 
Adolf Augustus Berle Jr. showed his intellectual capacity from an 
early age. He was homeschooled14 by his father, who taught him “how to 
learn what he needed to know before others [could detect] his ignor-
ance.”15 This teaching probably served him well, as he entered Harvard 
10. Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 
(1962). And for what inspired Berle to reply to Manne, see Manne 1962, supra note 3, at 400–06. 
11. William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L. J. 59, 74–76 (2005). 
12. Williamson, supra note 7, 11–13. 
13. Deakin, supra note 8. 
14. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 
7–9 (1987). 
15. Id. at 23.
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at the age of 14.16 By the age of 21, he had received three Harvard de-
grees and was the youngest student ever to graduate from Harvard Law 
School.17 After a year at Louis Brandeis’s Boston law firm,18 Berle en-
listed in the army19 and was placed on inactive duty to assist in sorting 
out the title system in American-occupied territories in order to boost 
sugar production, which was in high demand and short supply.20 Berle 
was next assigned by the military to the Paris Peace Conference as an 
expert (which he was not) on Russian economics.21 The destruction, dis-
ease, starvation, and general desolation of postwar Europe horrified and 
marked young Berle.22 Upon returning to America, he spent a short time 
at a lucrative New York law firm before establishing a modest practice 
on Wall Street in 1924. This position freed Berle to pursue more legal 
scholarship and social activism.23 
B. Berle’s Foundation of a Shareholder Primacy Theory 
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a period of 
violent labor relations.24 Berle regarded the trends toward the consolida-
tion of economic power in the hands of elites as a dangerous misstep to-
ward plutocracy and away from egalitarianism and democracy,25 which 
could further destabilize American society. He feared that America could 
easily plunge into the same economic and class conflicts that were soon 
to destroy Europe for a second time.26 Accordingly, Berle wanted to 
place economic and corporate power in the hands of the people. 
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 13–17. See generally id. at 1–17 (for additional information on Berle’s education). 
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 17.
20. ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A.
BERLE 4–7 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 
14, at 18–19. 
21. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 23–24 (writing of how his “expertise” consisted of a few
months research after coming back from the Dominican Republic). 
22. Id. at 28.
23. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
24. See generally GRAHAM ADAMS, JR., AGE OF INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE, 1910–1915: THE 
ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1971). 
25. Berle suggests that the rise of Bolshevism in Italy and Russia was being caused by the
needless division between capitalists and labor. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., How Labor Could Control, 
28 NEW REPUBLIC 37 (1921). 
26. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66. See generally PETER F. DRUCKER, THE END OF ECONOMIC
MAN: THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 3–23 (2009) (arguing that the Great Wars were caused by 
the inability of the nineteenth-century liberalism to transform the mercantile system of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries into a rational worldview that could bring equality to Europe by 
raising the material status of the masses, and also suggesting that, in Germany, the noneconomic 
fascism reverted to demonizing the Jewish population, manufacturing miracles using the propaganda 
machinery of the Third Reich, and generating positions of political power and status in order to 
circumvent preexisting economic power and status); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 
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Berle published an early plan for how this transfer of power could 
be accomplished in a short article entitled How Labor Could Control.27 
In the article, he explained that the corporation could be used as a tool 
for the redistribution of wealth and power to “the staff of the plant, in-
cluding, of course, the chairman of the board, the directors, as well as the 
oilers and feeders and loomfixers.”28 He suggested that organized labor 
(unions) could pool its resources to purchase or create corporations, and 
then could grant the shares of such corporations to the “staff of the 
plant.”29 Berle further explained: 
How shall the stock be distributed? According to the fairest apprais-
al of the value of the employee-stockholder’s services. The general 
manager ought to have more stock than the unskilled worker. His 
vote at a stockholders’ meeting ought to be worth more. He has 
earned it. What about wages? Every employee ought to draw a 
regular base pay just as a partner in a firm is entitled to his drawing 
account; he must live. How about labor turnover? One hopes this 
scheme would lessen it; but men will always leave old jobs for new. 
When a man leaves his job he must leave his stock too, resell it to 
the corporation, to use the vocabulary of corporation law, for a 
price. What price? The amount by which the value of the stock has 
been increased while that employee held it.30 
Each worker would be given ownership and control of the corpora-
tion in proportion to his contribution to the firm. Berle argued that if this 
occurred: 
No single process in the industry would have to be changed, but 
each man would be working for himself and his “wage slavery” 
would become merely an occupation in cooperative endeavor.31 
What about the role for traditional shareholders in the corporation? 
He suggested: 
These stockholders are, in many corporations, not true investors; 
they “took a chance” . . . . They would not say so, but they looked 
for something for nothing; they bought the stock for a rise, and to 
collect large dividends if they can. This class is under attack as ex-
ploiters.32 
                                                                                                                                                
3 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that economic liberalism represented a “stark utopia,” which hurtled Euro-
pean society into the World Wars). 
 27. Berle, supra note 25. 
 28. Id. at 38. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 37. 
 32. Id. at 38. 
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So, Berle advocated for shareholder control of the corporation, but 
he wanted to change who populated the shareholder class. According to 
his article, if he had his way, the deserving “staff of the plant”33 would 
replace the undeserving exploiter–gambler shareholders. That said, he 
did see a place in the shareholder class for manager–investor sharehold-
ers who, although rare, were of value to the corporation. He wrote: 
The legitimate side to [the operation of traditional shareholders in 
corporate governance] lies in the fact that these stockholders have a 
power of management. . . . As matter of plain fact however they 
usually do not manage . . . [but a] small group do manage and earn 
much of what they receive.34 
In summary, Berle not only advocated for keeping the corporate 
structure of the business organization, but also for repopulating the 
shareholder class. He wanted to remove those shareholders who merely 
bought, hoped, held, and cashed in “when they [could] reap where they 
did not sew.”35 These shareholders did not deserve more than “the cur-
rent rate of interest”36 because “the value of their management was nil.”37 
Berle concluded that his argument was: 
No . . . attack on private property; on the contrary, it [was] the em-
phasis of the strength of property. It [was] not a blow at our settled 
economic institutions; it [was] the sane use of them.38 
After this article, Berle shifted his position slightly. He began to fo-
cus on how the American economy was evolving. He witnessed the 
greater dispersion of share ownership out of the hands of business elites 
and into the hands of the middle and working classes.39 Berle viewed this 
transfer of power as a positive development, which could achieve the 
same ends as his previously devised scheme: the democratization of eco-
nomic power.40 To his disappointment, the legal community was com-
pensating for this change in ownership by advocating for less shareholder 
control and more managerial control over the corporation. Berle thought 
that this advocacy of managerialism would compromise this transfer of 
                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 37–38. 
 35. Id. at 38. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 39. 
 39. See SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 65–66. 
 40. Id. at 66. 
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power. In his more personal and candid writings, he revealed that these 
concerns motivated him to promote shareholder primacy.41 
Berle envisioned how an empowered shareholder class, with its ex-
panded working- and middle-class membership, could transform Ameri-
can society.42 This corporate liberal revolution43 was, as Berle put it, 
merely “the logical working out of [the American] system,” which, as a 
liberal, he believed to be a sound foundation for social order.44 His vision 
of the corporate liberal revolution placed the corporation at its center be-
cause the corporation had the capacity to disperse ownership and eco-
nomic power widely with little change to the legal structure of the corpo-
ration and the economy.45 All the safeguards were in place to protect this 
emerging class of shareholders; all that was needed was the will to fol-
low through. 
Berle became convinced that the key to unlocking the potential of 
the corporation as a tool of economic revolution was to firmly establish 
the property and fiduciary rights of shareholders within the governance 
mechanism. This governance mechanism would be a safeguard against 
the action of powerful elite interests that would want to counteract the 
threats of the egalitarian operation of the corporation. Although too radi-
cal to be an explicit policy-reform agenda, the Corporate Liberal Revolu-
tion was at the core of the shareholder primacy argument that Berle 
would develop in the 1920s. 
Berle’s theory of the Corporate Liberal Revolution is significant to 
understand because it makes clear that his motivation for endorsing 
shareholder primacy was to shape the corporation to be a tool to demo-
cratize the American economy. Understanding this motivation helps one 
appreciate Berle’s later shift away from shareholder primacy toward oth-
er strategies to bring economic power under democratic controls. Share-
holder primacy was not an end for Berle, it was merely a means to an 
end. 
                                                                 
 41. Id.; see also BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 
1932, in which he reflects upon how the fact that directors and managers abused their authority 
inspired him to advocate for greater fiduciary protection of shareholder rights from 1923 to 1926). 
 42. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66. 
 43. Although Schwarz uses the terms “corporate,” “liberal,” and “revolution,” there is no clear 
evidence that Berle used this language. Yet this language aptly describes his vision. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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C. Berle’s Shareholder Primacy Theory 
Berle’s 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles map the progress of his 
shareholder primacy theory.46 Berle stated explicitly in his diary that 
these articles “led to the next stage of [his] career.”47 In a diary entry 
from August 1932, he further reflected upon these four articles, writing: 
The attempt I was then making was to assert the doctrine that corpo-
rate managements were virtually trustees for their stockholders, and 
that they could not therefore deal in the freewheeling manner in 
which directors and managers had dealt with the stock and other in-
terests of their companies up to that time. It was the beginning of 
the fiduciary theory of corporations which now is generally ac-
cepted.48 
Put differently, Berle emphasized shareholder rights, arguing that man-
agers were accountable to exercise their discretion within, and only with-
in, the scope of their preexisting obligations to shareholders in order to 
ensure some measure of accountability within corporate operation and 
thus avoid at least some incidents of managerial opportunism. 
The first article, published in 1923, argued that the discretion of 
management was not so broad that it could ignore the contracted proce-
dure for the manner in which dividends were to be distributed.49 In his 
second article, Berle advanced his theory, arguing that managers had an 
equitable duty that controlled managerial discretion when financial inno-
vations (like the discretionary issue of non-par stocks) created holes in 
preexisting contractual obligations.50 
                                                                 
 46. For a complete record of Berle’s published works up to the early 1960s, see Henry G. 
Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1427 (1964). 
 47. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug, 25, 1932). 
 48. Id. (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
 49. Berle noted that the trend in corporate law to grant directors broad power to distribute 
dividends could violate shareholders’ rights, which necessitated a more narrow interpretation of 
managerial power. Although the discretion to withhold dividends to bolster the capital of the corpo-
ration was absolute and equitable, if the corporation used the dividends of non-cumulative preferred 
stockholders, these dividends were not lost to this class, but had to be recorded and returned to them 
before common shareholders could receive dividends. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Cumulative 
Preferred Stocks, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 358, 358–59, 367 (1923). 
 50. In this article, preexisting shareholders’ rights were challenged by discretion to issue non-
par stocks. This challenge was significant because such contractual arrangements could not have 
foreseen this innovation. Berle acknowledged that such unforeseen evolutions in corporate law 
created a crisis because they potentially freed management to act without regard for the interests of 
shareholders. To remedy this failure of the contract, Berle asserted that the rights of shareholders 
created an obligation for management (like agents) to manage the corporation in shareholders’ best 
interests, regardless of whether this obligation was explicitly contractual. Berle appeared confident 
that courts would recognize that shareholders could rely on equity to protect their rights. See Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr., Problems of Non-Par Stocks, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 43–46, 63 (1925). 
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The final two articles were both written in 1926. The first, pub-
lished in the Columbia Law Review, argued that equity guided manageri-
al discretion beyond contract. Essentially, when contractual safeguards 
failed to protect minority shareholders, management still had an equita-
ble duty to defend weaker shareholders from powerful ones who might 
exercise their influence over management in a manner oppressive to the 
minority.51 Finally, in his 1926 Harvard Law Review article, Berle fur-
thered this argument by demonstrating that equity compensated for the 
de facto imbalance of power between shareholders. He argued that the 
law would ensure that management treated all shareholders evenhanded-
ly, guaranteeing that the interests of ownership were not undermined.52 
When these articles are read with Berle’s biographical context in 
mind, it becomes clear that his prime concern was controlling the self-
interested and irresponsible actions of management, who controlled one 
of the most important political actors within American society: the cor-
poration.53 More importantly, Berle’s more candid writings indicate that 
he wanted the corporation to help American society avoid the internal 
strife that Europe appeared doomed to suffer.54 Accordingly, his objec-
tive was to help empower shareholders (which he saw as representative 
of the middle and working classes) to make corporate managers firmly 
accountable to their control: in other words, the wider polity. He envi-
sioned the distribution of corporate ownership through the middle and 
working classes as a mechanism to place the power of economic concen-
tration under a form of democratic control through shareholder power. In 
fact, Berle had the bold ambition of becoming the prophet of the share-
holding class, or as he so modestly put it, “the American Karl Marx.”55 
Berle’s articles did not express his radical hopes for the corporate-
liberal revolution. This restraint is understandable. As a young academic 
attempting to establish his reputation, it would have been unwise to 
frame his shareholder primacy theory in line with his radical labor and 
                                                                 
 51. Berle explored how management allocated dividends (and losses) between share classes of 
the corporation. Once again, he employed the theory of the corporation as the private property of 
shareholders. He asserted that even after management allocated initial preferred dividends in accor-
dance with explicit contractual requirements, the remaining surplus, if it was be to be allocated as 
dividends, was subject to an equitable distribution. This illustrated how principles of equity, beyond 
contract, provided a rationale for ordering how dividends were to be portioned among shareholders. 
This protected weaker shareholders from the influence of powerful ones. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Participating Preferred Stock, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 303, 305, 317 (1926). 
 52. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV. 673 
(1926). 
 53. BERLE, supra note 20, at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
 54. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66. 
 55. Berle exclaimed to his wife that “his real ambition in life is to be the American Karl 
Marx—a social prophet.” See SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62; see also Thomas K. McCraw, Berle 
and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIS. 578, 579 (1990). 
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anticapitalist views. Although the hostilities and violence that characte-
rized America’s industrial relations at the turn of the century seemed to 
have ended,56 the “age of industrial violence” was still fresh in the minds 
of Americans.57 Consequently, such extreme opinions would likely have 
been either rejected outright or would have drawn serious and unneces-
sary criticism to Berle’s project. He figured that he did not have to 
preach the revolution because the market was evolving the corporate 
form toward an ever-more widely dispersed share ownership. So, as long 
as the rights of shareholders were protected, his more radical surrepti-
tious agenda would be furthered without making his goals explicit. In 
other words, Berle predicted that the existing regulation and market func-
tion would guide the radical social work so long as the corporate legal 
infrastructure was in place to protect the rights of shareholders. 
Confident in the direction the market was moving, Berle con-
structed arguments based on property rights, justifying shareholder au-
thority over corporate management.58 Each article followed a similar log-
ic: the corporation was the private property of its shareholders, and be-
cause managers had a fiduciary relationship with these owners, managers 
owed a duty of care to owners. This relationship was captured in law by 
contract and, as Berle noted in later works, by equity as well. Each article 
noted how corporate management was granted discretion over the admin-
istration of shareholder rights, which prima facie appeared quite broad.59 
But each area of discretion was held in check by a broad interpretation of 
shareholder rights, and thus the range of managerial choice that actually 
existed was more restricted than an observer might have assumed. 
It makes sense to track Berle’s work up to 1927 because that is 
when he likely wrote the first article in the Berle–Dodd debate, Corpo-
rate Powers as Powers in Trust. And this article is a word-for-word re-
production of most of a chapter from The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property (a point noted in detail in the following sections). And be-
cause Berle’s work on the book started in 1927, a draft of this article 
could have been written anytime between 1927 and 1931. Thus, the ar-
ticle could have been drafted in 1927.60 This fact creates a reasonable end 
                                                                 
 56. In 1928, only 694 strikes occurred representing the fewest since 1884, and in 1929, there 
were only 900 work stoppages, involving merely 1.2% of the labor force. For more details on how 
the rise of living standards in the 1920s helped smooth the way for more peaceful industrial rela-
tions, see ROBERT H. ZIEGER & GILBERT J. GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS: THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 45 (3d ed. 2002). 
 57. ADAMS, supra note 24. 
 58. Berle, supra note 49; Berle, supra note 50; Berle, supra note 51; Berle, supra note 52. 
 59. See supra, notes 44–47. 
 60. The obvious challenge to drawing a distinction as early as 1927 is that the footnotes in 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust make reference to cases as late as 1930. But this detail is less 
significant in light of the fact that in practice, drafts of articles are constantly modified prior to publi-
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point for the consideration of Berle’s shareholder primacy argument 
prior to the writing of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
III. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A. The Making of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
In 1927, a Harvard connection helped Berle to land a sizable grant 
from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation to study recent trends in 
corporate development.61 The grant was contingent upon him obtaining 
an academic appointment,62 which he soon received from Columbia Uni-
versity.63 The grant requirements also demanded that the project use the 
expertise of an associate economist.64 By chance, his old bunkmate from 
officer training at Plattsburg Camp,65 Gardiner C. Means, had just 
enrolled at Harvard as a candidate for a Ph.D. in economics.66 Means’s 
interests in the economic implications of the separation of ownership and 
control dovetailed nicely with Berle’s legal study of the modern corpora-
tion,67 so Berle invited him to assist.68 The end result was The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. 
Berle intended The Modern Corporation and Private Property to 
become a classic and purposefully crafted the book with this intention. 
                                                                                                                                                
cation so that they reflect the current commentary on the law. Therefore, it is very plausible that the 
footnotes only indicate that a revision of the article occurred during or after 1930, which is much 
different than the potential claim that a draft of the article could not have been written before 1930. 
Furthermore, one should consider how similar Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust is to the other 
law review articles up to 1927. In fact, this article could easily be regarded as a direct extension of 
the 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles. Thus, it is quite reasonable—even if unconfirmed by the historical 
record—to suggest that Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust might have been one of the first parts 
of the book written, making 1927 a cautious and prudent ending point for Berle’s history up to the 
Berle–Dodd Debate. 
 61. Edwin F. Gay actually devised the project. Gay was an economic historian who became the 
founding dean of the Harvard Business School. He was advising various foundations (including the 
Social Science Research Council, which sponsored the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation) on 
what types of economic issues deserved funding. For his Rockefeller project, he wanted to blend the 
expertise of a lawyer and an economist to study the modern corporation. See HERBERT HEATON, A 
SCHOLAR IN ACTION: EDWIN F. GAY 211 (1952). 
 62. BERLE, supra note 20, at 21 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
 63. C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr., COLUM. 
UNIV., http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/a_a_berle.html (last vi-
sited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 64. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, at xxxix (2d ed. 1968) (1932). 
 65. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 51; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF 
LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: THE BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 299–305, 
316–17 (1955). 
 66. BERLE, supra note 20, at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
 67. Id. at 51. 
 68. Id. at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on Aug. 25, 1932). 
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He wanted this work to make him an opinion-maker for the intellectual 
elites of America.69 Berle was not in favor of antitrust measures because 
he believed that the large modern corporation, with a widely dispersed 
share base, ought to be the primary actor of the American economy. But 
he knew that in order to appeal to the legal intelligentsia, he would have 
to be careful to achieve the favor of American legal icons like Louis 
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, who were staunch critics of big business 
and strong advocates of antitrust measures.70 
As planned, the book became famous as a warning of the potential 
threat of corporate managerial plutocracy over American society, de-
monstrating how modern corporations were consuming the American 
economy71 and how unrestrained managers were controlling these mod-
ern corporations. By focusing on the latter and ignoring the former when 
making his recommendations, he could offer a sacrifice to powerful anti-
trust advocates but still focus his recommendations on the distinct issue 
of the control of management. In short, he appeased the antitrusters for 
the time being while still progressing with his alternative agenda of 
transforming the corporation into a mechanism that ensured the greater 
democratization of economic power. In the end, Berle succeeded in his 
ambition; when published, the book was celebrated as one of the most 
important of its time.72 
B. The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
Berle and Means pointed to the key features of the modern corpora-
tion’s evolution, namely: an increase in corporate concentration of prop-
erty73 and a decrease in control over corporate management by owners,74 
which was a by-product of ever-increasing stock ownership dispersion.75 
                                                                 
 69. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 62. 
 70. Id. at 14, 67–68, 83–85, 89, 104. 
 71. For a later and far more advanced understanding of how corporations capture economies, 
see Coase, supra note 6, 389–91. 
 72. In Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era, Schwarz notes that the book 
review from the New York Herald Tribune applauded the book as a “masterly achievement of re-
search and contemplation” and wondered if it could be “the most important work bearing on Ameri-
can statecraft” since the Federalist Papers. Jerome Frank wrote, “This book will perhaps rank with 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the 
existence of a new economic epoch.” Ernest Gruening called it “epoch-making.” Harry W. Laigler 
proclaimed it was “bound to make economic history.” In 1932, Justice Brandeis cited the book call-
ing it the work of “able, discerning scholars” in the Liggett v. Lee case. By the spring of 1933, Time 
magazine dubbed it “the economic Bible of the Roosevelt administration.” SCHWARZ, supra note 14, 
at 60–61 (internal citations omitted). 
 73. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at vii–viii, 44–45; see also Adolf A. Berle, Property, 
Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1965). 
 74. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 119–40. 
 75. Id. at 64–65. 
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They noted that this led to an increased concentration of power for cor-
porate managers76 and elite financial groups.77 The book cast the threat of 
corporate hegemony over freedom, suggesting that plutocracy could su-
persede state democracy as the dominant form of social organization. 
Berle and Means centered on the need for shareholders to have 
meaningful control over their corporations. What Means’s empirical re-
search proved was that the opposite was occurring,78 resulting in a frac-
ture between ownership and control of property.79 The authors warned 
that this emergent situation might cause market distortions,80 especially if 
the gap between ownership and control continued to widen, amplifying 
the perversion of the classic theory of market function.81 To explain their 
logic, if profit was to work as a virtuous incentive, the traditional logic 
demanded that only a “fair return” be dispersed to the shareholders (as 
the owners of the property without control) and that the remainder go to 
the management (who control the property) because profit would induce 
the most efficient decision-making, and management made the deci-
sions.82 The authors concluded that: “The corporation would thus be op-
erated financially in the interest of control, the stockholder becoming 
merely the recipient of the wages of capital . . . [running] counter to the 
conclusion reached by applying the traditional logic of property to pre-
cisely the same situation.”83 
What Berle and Means probably meant by “the traditional logic of 
property” is that there is control of that piece of property. Or, as Morris 
Cohen characterized it, a right over a possession,84 which implicitly is 
assumed to grant a right to self-assertion,85 or a claim to a sovereign 
power86 over a possession, without the interference of government pow-
er.87 To put the term more concretely, in the context of the authors’ sug-
                                                                 
 76. Berle and Means prophesize: 
What will be the development in the field of ‘control’? It is not easy to 
proph[esize]. . . . Economically, the problem is likely to change in form as corporations 
gradually increase in size and as stock distribution increases, to the point where the ‘con-
trol’ is virtually in the hands of a self-perpetuating Board of Directors . . . . 
Id. at 217–18. 
 77. See id. at 206. For an example of such control groups, see Berle, supra note 52, at 673–77. 
 78. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 128–31, 245; see also Gardiner C. Means, The Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46 Q. J. OF ECON. 68 (1931) (an article that 
Means published a year before with much of the core research findings). 
 79. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 303–08. 
 80. Id. at 302–08. 
 81. Id. at 302. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927). 
 85. Id. at 18. 
 86. Id. at 29. 
 87. Id. at 11. 
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gestion, it means that owners ought to receive the profits of the corpora-
tion because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and are 
the rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclu-
sion of all nonowners. 
Berle and Means predicted that separation of ownership and control 
would create a new logic for property,88 which would be inspired by the 
better appreciation of the “economic relationships” between economic 
actors.89 They did not provide any hints as to what these new “economic 
relationships” would be like. And no evidence exists that Berle ever se-
riously entertained the more radical ideas of the legal realists regarding 
property.90 
C. A Note on the Use of Corporatism 
William Bratton and Michael Wachter discuss how Berle and Dodd 
competed in their advocacy of rivaling models of corporatism.91 In Brat-
ton and Wachter’s opinion, Berle endorsed planners’ corporatism,92 
which describes the cooperative relationship between business, civil so-
ciety, and government. Together, these parties determine and coordinate 
policies that satisfy the public interest. Bratton and Wachter also suggest 
that Dodd endorsed business commonwealth corporatism.93 Like plan-
ners’ corporatism, this form of corporatism focuses on the collaborative 
relationships shared by different groups in order to establish what is in 
the public interest.94 After the public interest is established, policies are 
adopted, adapted, and coordinated among different groups in order to 
achieve the agreed-upon goals. The distinction between the two models 
of corporatism is that while planners’ corporatism advocates that the 
government take the lead role, business commonwealth corporatism ar-
gues for industrialists to take the lead, “relegating government to a back-
stop, supporting role.”95 This Article agrees that Berle could have been 
characterized as a planners’ corporatist, but rejects the notion that Dodd 
was a business commonwealth corporatist. 
                                                                 
 88. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 302. 
 89. Id. at 308. 
 90. One’s imagination can easily attach Cohen’s critique of the long-established understanding 
of property rights and his seemingly sensible, but explosively contentious, redefinition of property 
rights as having “positive duties” to public interest included. See Cohen, supra note 84, at 15–21. 
 91. Bratton and Wachter adopt their models of corporatism from Ellis Hawley. See Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 9, at 122–23; see also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM 
OF MONOPOLY 36–43 (1966). 
 92. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 123. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 122–23. 
 95. Id. at 122 (Bratton and Wachter’s explanation of corporatism). 
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John Cioffi offers complexity to Bratton and Wachter’s use of 
“corporatism.” Cioffi argues that characterizing Berle as an advocate of 
corporatism is misplaced.96 He argues that, at best, Berle advocated for 
“quasi-corporatist arrangements during the early New Deal,” which were 
contradictory and vague in nature.97 Mindful of Cioffi’s position,98 this 
Article will continue to use the term “corporatism” (more precisely, Brat-
ton and Wachter’s planners’ corporatism and business commonwealth 
corporatism) in order to maintain a continuity of language between this 
Article and the ongoing discussion about Berle and corporatism that 
Bratton and Wachter sparked. This Article, however, is also mindful that 
planners’ corporatism cannot be said to be a form of corporatism as clas-
sically defined.99 To be clear, “corporatism” in this Article refers to the 
“quasi-corporatist arrangements” that Berle envisioned and not corporat-
ism as classically defined. 
D. The Importance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
to the Berle–Dodd Debate 
It is important to sum up before moving forward so that the reader 
is mindful of the ground covered thus far. In the 1920s, Berle regarded 
the trends toward managerialism as a dangerous mistake that could des-
tabilize American society. He feared that managerialism, without safe-
guards, could amplify the economic inequalities in America and provoke 
Bolshevist elements in American society. As a result, Berle started to 
construct arguments based on property rights, which justified shareholder 
authority over corporate management. Underpinning Berle’s efforts (and 
this is important for understanding Berle’s arguments throughout the de-
bate) was the evolution of the public corporation with its ever-widening 
ownership class, which continued to increase the potential of democratiz-
ing economic power within American society. For this reason, if corpo-
                                                                 
 96. John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous 
Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2011). 
 97. Id. at 1086. 
 98. Upon reflection, Cioffi’s article ought to be considered in light of the role that corporatist 
thinking now plays in the merging forms of regulatory capitalism that are visibly emerging today. So 
much more could be said about Berle, corporatism, regulatory capitalism, and Cioffi’s article, but an 
aside will have to do for now. For more on the role that corporatism is playing in regulatory capital-
ism, see David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interest, 27 
POL’Y & SOC’Y 181, 188 (2009). 
 99. Corporatism is classically defined as “a system of interest representation in which the con-
stituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierar-
chically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by 
the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
support.” Cioffi, supra note 96, at 1088 (quoting PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, STILL THE CENTURY OF 
CORPORATISM? (1974)). 
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rate managers could be compelled to act for the sole benefit of share-
holders, the corporation ought to be the primary actor of the American 
economy. This ties his early shareholder primacy arguments firmly to the 
perceived needs of the broader polity of American society. 
Against this background, the importance of The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property to the Berle–Dodd debate becomes clear. The 
first article in the debate was an exact replication of a chapter from the 
book, with one key omission. The article did not contain his candid ad-
mission that his arguments were constructed “with full realization of the 
possibility that private property may one day cease to be the basic con-
cept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale enter-
prise.”100 In the missing text, he also argued that it was possible that “the 
entire system [had] to be revalued” and that “the corporate profit stream 
in reality no longer [was] private property,” asserting that a new theory, 
which adequately explained the phenomenon of the modern corporation, 
would likely develop.101 But he qualified these views as a matter of soci-
ological study, which regardless of their factual merit, had not yet at-
tained a standing as a “matter of law.”102 He suggested that finding a su-
perior theory to explain the distortion created by modern corporations 
upon private property was “rather the [reflection] of a movement which 
[was] likely to take form in the future, than the statement of a present 
ordering of affairs.”103 Berle recommended that until a new corporate 
theory became a “matter of law,” lawyers and legal academics must do 
their best within the existing legal framework—that being to think “in 
terms of private property.”104 And that is exactly what Berle did in the 
1931 article with his bullish argument that “all powers granted to a cor-
poration . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits 
of all the shareholders as their interest appears”105 without qualification. 
Berle’s apparent support for planners’ corporatism seems to contra-
dict his argument for shareholder primacy. Berle’s arguments, however, 
are consistent because he only meant judicial protection of shareholder 
primacy to be an interim measure. He concluded that the shareholder 
primacy position, which he fully acknowledged was less than adequate, 
would need to be advocated until a satisfactory solution to the corporate 
power problem could be established.106 Berle thought that the chapter 
                                                                 
 100. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 219–20. 
 105. Id. at 220; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049, 1049 (1931). 
 106. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 219–20. 
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endorsing planners’ corporatism was the most important107 because it 
pointed toward what he believed to be the future direction of corporate 
law. Thus, the book is rightly interpreted to be both endorsing planners’ 
corporatism108 and shareholder primacy. This clarification provides criti-
cal insight into the nature of his shareholder primacy argument and con-
textualizes it with the rest of the arguments from the book.109 As a result, 
Berle’s evolving position was not inconsistent, as most scholars sug-
gest.110 When Berle’s arguments are fully contextualized with the fact 
that he only intended for shareholder primacy to be an interim measure 
until a more adequate clarification of the modern corporation was offered 
and accepted by the legal and business communities, his position is con-
sistent. 
This discussion leaves one final loose end: Berle’s understanding of 
the corporation as a democratizing actor within modern society in the 
future. It can be argued that his vision of how the corporation related to 
the wider polity shifted from a vision of private government in which 
managers ran larger corporate actors, controlling the American economy 
for the benefit of shareholders representing all classes of American socie-
ty, to a vision of hybrid public–private government in which a democra-
tized corporate actor took a partnership role in the co-governance of the 
economy with government. But this shift is not such a dramatic shift as 
one might first assume. Both roads lead to the same end: using the path 
of democracy through the corporate governance mechanism to achieve 
the alignment of corporate action with public interest. 
                                                                 
 107. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 63; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 121. 
 108. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 118–222. 
 109. It is unfortunate that neither Berle’s personal writings, nor his biography, nor any of his 
other publications acknowledge this connection between the article Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust and The Modern Corporation and Private Property. As a result, no explanation exists for why 
he omitted this important insight from the 1931 article that was published just before the book was 
released. The missing text is critical to properly contextualize the Berle–Dodd debate. This insight 
clearly establishes that, although Berle appeared to be entirely committed to his shareholder primacy 
argument in the 1931 article, he undoubtedly acknowledged that this argument represented no more 
than an interim solution. Thus, although the argument in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust ap-
peared unequivocal, the missing text, which would soon appear in the book, established that his 
argument was equivocal. 
 110. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 101 n.5. For allusions to the contradictions in 
Berle’s work and thus the danger of misrepresenting his position, see David Millon, Theory of the 
Corporation, DUKE L.J. 201, 222 (1990), and see generally C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 77, 95–99, 101–04 (2002) (describing Berle’s transitions of opinion from 1931 up to the 
1960s). 
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IV. THE BERLE–DODD DEBATE 
A. Berle’s Declaration: Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust 
While working on The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Berle continued to publish other pieces.111 These works continued to ar-
gue for greater protection of shareholder rights. His writing inspired a 
range of reactions. Although some agreed that new safeguards were 
needed to protect shareholders (especially to secure a higher rate of in-
vestment),112 the majority argued that Berle’s assessment was a reactio-
nary overstatement that ran “counter to the historical evolution of the 
corporation.”113 With Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, he probably 
                                                                 
 111. Those pieces were the following: ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE 
LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1930) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS]; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
The Organization of the Law of Corporation Finance, 9 TENN. L. REV. 125 (1931); Adolf A. Berle, 
Jr., Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1239 (1931); Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1931); Adolf A. Berle, 
Jr., Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits, 42 HARV. L. REV. 748 (1929); 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Promoters’ Stock in Subsidiary Corporations, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1929); 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 563 
(1929); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulation, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
874 (1928); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649 
(1927); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Publicity of Accounts and Directors’ Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L. 
REV. 827 (1927). 
 112. Karl McGinnis believed that the law was progressing toward greater protection of share-
holders and that Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance was an important 
contribution toward understanding the problem of shareholder protection. See E. Karl McGinnis, 
Book Review, 10 TEX. L. REV. 122 (1931) (reviewing CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 111). 
Irving Levy observed that Berle’s suggestions in Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance were 
heterodox, acknowledging the protest of corporate lawyers to Berle’s advocacy of the equitable 
control of management by shareholders. He explained that some practitioners believed that Berle’s 
theory in action would be paramount to judicial interference with the ability of managers to exercise 
their professionally informed discretion over the corporation. That said, Levy sided with Berle be-
cause he believed that establishing safeguards over managerial dissertation was prudent. See Irving 
J. Levy, Book Review, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 552 (1929) (reviewing ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE 
LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928)). 
 113. Joseph L. Kline, who was a Wall Street corporate lawyer, argued, “Any movement to 
increase the power of shareholders as such runs counter to the historical evolution of corporations. 
Mr. Berle’s thesis is therefore essentially reactionary.” See Joseph V. Kline, Book Review, 42 HARV. 
L. REV. 714, 717 (1929) (reviewing ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION 
FINANCE (1928)). Laylin K. James, in reviewing Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corpo-
ration Finance, attacked his arguments for the greater protection of shareholders as too zealous. See 
Laylin K. James, Book Review, 26 ILL. L. REV. 712 (1932). Franklin S. Wood responded to Berle’s 
1926 article Non-Voting Stocks and “Bankers’ Control,” arguing that Berle’s equitable remedies 
solution to the problem of managerial control was unjustifiable under sound principles of law and 
equity. See Franklin S. Wood, The Status of Management Stockholders, 38 YALE L.J. 57 (1928). 
When reviewing Berle’s Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance, Robert T. Swaine disagreed 
with Berle’s position, but did not question his statement of the law, writing: “But, however much 
one may dissent from Mr. Berle’s underlying philosophy, these essays must be recognized as an 
excellent and stimulating bit of advocacy. As a statement of the present state of the law they are of 
doubtful accuracy.” See Robert T. Swaine, Book Review, 38 YALE L.J. 1003, 1004 (1929). And 
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expected more of the same criticism; however, his most formidable critic 
would be unexpected. In the Harvard Law Review, E. Merrick Dodd ac-
cused Berle of being a dangerous conservative. This was too much for 
the self-styled American Karl Marx to bear, and he promptly penned a 
reply in the following issue.114 
In the initial article, Berle argued that because “all powers granted 
to a corporation . . . [were] at all times exercisable only for the ratable 
benefits of all the shareholders as their interest appears,”115 a legal foun-
dation existed to develop and enforce greater fiduciary ties between 
management and shareholders. He explained that the existing rights and 
restrictions of corporate law were no more than “nominal[]” rules,116 in 
the sense that they were only guidelines for how corporate governance 
ought to function. But when these guidelines conflicted with the equita-
ble rights of shareholders, he opined that equity prevailed.117 As a result, 
managerial actions were bound by equity, no matter how absolute the 
power granted to managers might appear or how technically correct the 
exercise of such power was.118 Although the argument was obviously 
anti-managerialist, he explained the nature of the equitable protections of 
shareholders in a manner that did not appear to be limiting managerial 
discretion; rather, he suggested that such interpretation of the rules ex-
panded managerial authority to go beyond the technical limitations in 
order to better protect the interests of shareholders.119 
Berle further described five scenarios120 in which shareholders 
granted management wide discretion over corporate conduct.121 In each, 
no matter how absolute the discretion appeared, such power had to be 
exercised in accordance with equitable limitations.122 The underlying 
theory that bound managerial discretion to equitable control in each of 
                                                                                                                                                
Wilbur G. Katz argued that Berle overstated the law; he also rejected his shareholder primacy 
theory, arguing that Berle underemphasized the potential downside of his equitable solutions, con-
demning him for being too critical of management and being too eager to create the impression that 
the complexities of many financial and intercorporate transactions are all the result of “corporate 
skullduggery.” See Wilbur G. Katz, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1931). 
 114. For the observation that Berle considered himself the American Karl Marx, see McCraw, 
supra note 55. For his outrage at being accused of being a Tory, see SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 66. 
 115. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105. 
 116. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105. 
 117. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105. 
 118. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050. 
 119. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1049–50. 
 120. The five examples are: (1) power to issue stocks, (2) power to declare or withhold divi-
dends, (3) power to acquire stocks in another corporation, (4) power to amend the corporate charter, 
and (5) power to merge with another enterprise. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 221–40; 
Berle, supra note 105, at 1050–72. 
 121. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 220; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050–72. 
 122. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 221; Berle, supra note 105, at 1050. 
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the five scenarios was the understanding of the corporation as being ex-
clusively private property, which supported the argument that all powers 
granted to management were exclusively for the benefit of sharehold-
ers.123 But Berle hesitated to assert that this understanding of the fidu-
ciary duty of management could evolve into a branch of trust law be-
cause such a duty must be less rigorous than other trust situations. Oth-
erwise, the burden placed upon corporate management could be too great 
to reasonably optimize market efficiency.124 
The timing of the publication of Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust is noteworthy because it occurred just months before the publica-
tion of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.125 It was much 
like Means’s publication of The Separation of Ownership and Control in 
American Industry, which was published at about the same time and was 
designed to have much the same effect in the world of economics.126 
Given the academic community’s anticipation of the upcoming book, the 
article provided Berle with an opportunity to emphasize his central ar-
gument prior to its release.127 This early exposure was important to Berle 
because he wanted to ensure that other important points in the book did 
not overshadow his shareholder primacy argument. In other words, the 
early release of this argument can be interpreted as Berle’s effort to pre-
vent shareholder primacy from becoming obscured by the pandemonium 
the book was anticipated to create about the looming threat of corporate 
power. 
B. Dodd, the Anti-Managerialist 
Edwin Merrick Dodd, the son of a wool merchant, was born in 
Providence, Rhode Island, in 1888.128 He entered Harvard College in 
1910.129 His first teaching position in law was at Washington & Lee,130 
but the Great War interrupted his fledgling career. During the war, he 
served as a member of the legal staff for the War Industries Board.131 
After the war, he practiced law for a short time but soon realized that he 
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preferred academia.132 He taught at both the Universities of Nebraska and 
Chicago133 before returning to Harvard Law School in 1928,134 where he 
taught for twenty-three years.135 
Two recurring anti-managerialist leanings can be found in Dodd’s 
work. First, he emphasizes the promotion of the fiduciary duty of corpo-
rate management. Second, he places importance on the protection of 
fairness and equity between classes of security holders.136 Dodd consis-
tently asserted that managers were in a position of trust and confidence, 
which led him to urge courts to be more diligent in enforcing managerial 
obligations.137 His works indicated that he generally argued the anti-
managerialist position, so one would assume that he would agree with 
Berle’s position. But this was not the case, for although they may have 
shared much common ground, upon reading Berle’s 1931 article (and 
possibly all of his legal articles up to 1931), Dodd deduced that Berle 
was too radical in his protection of shareholder rights. Berle’s radical 
stance, from Dodd’s perspective, was sacrificing the broader responsi-
bility of managers to the community, as well as the potential that corpo-
ratism had to stabilize American capitalism at the time.138 
In fact, Dodd was so disturbed by the implications of Berle’s argu-
ment that he uncharacteristically employed a managerialist argument in 
order to attempt to undermine Berle’s shareholder primacy theory. He 
determined that Berle’s extreme stance was dangerous, making manage-
ment no more than advocates solely for shareholders by limiting the 
                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Ralph J. Baker, Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65 HARV. L. REV. 388, 389 (1952). 
 135. Chafee, supra note 128, at 381. 
 136. Baker, supra note 134, at 389. 
 137. A review of examples that support this claim from the body of Dodd’s work follows. In a 
two-part series, Dodd explored the limits of management power to alter corporate charters. See E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L. 
REV. 585 (1927); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate 
Charters (Continued), 75 U. PA. L. REV. 723 (1927). In another particularly relevant article, Dodd 
traced the radical change in the impact of the fiduciary principle from small-scale to large-scale 
capitalism. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal 
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941). In another, Dodd argued that corporate management’s 
ability to purchase and redeem its own company shares ought to be brought within the fiduciary 
obligation. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: 
The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1941). Dodd again argued that corporate management 
ought to act in light of their fiduciary obligation for the benefit of security holders in relation to their 
interest. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780 
(1942). In the following article, he showed great concern for the fiduciary principles, especially in 
relation to the obligation of majority shareholders to minority shareholders or to a particular class of 
shares. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Liability of a Holding Company for Obtaining for Itself Property 
Needed by a Subsidiary—The Blaustein Case, 58 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1944). For supporting com-
mentary, see Baker, supra note 134, at 390; Chaffee, supra note 128, at 382. 
 138. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 124–28. 
1478 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1457 
scope of managerial accountability to the maximization of profits, and 
when necessary, doing this at the expense of all other corporate constitu-
ents. 
C. Dodd’s Response to Berle: For Whom Are  
Corporate Managers Trustees? 
Both authors had different views on to whom duties should be 
owed. Dodd argued that the managers’ duty ought to be extended to oth-
er stakeholders. From his perspective, managers were granted many 
freedoms, whether through law or factual circumstance, to conduct busi-
ness in a manner that would not necessarily maximize profits.139 Dodd 
observed that this freedom appeared to have agitated Berle to place un-
due emphasis on the fiduciary relationship between managers and share-
holders.140 Dodd’s assumption regarding Berle’s motivations was incor-
rect, even at face value: Berle was clearly attempting to prevent mana-
gerial opportunism.141 In other words, he wanted to bring managerial dis-
cretion under legal control, not line shareholders’ pockets regardless of 
the consequences. 
Dodd also wanted to maintain the gap between ownership and con-
trol of the modern corporation so that private property rights would not 
restrict management’s decisions. He adopted an understanding of the 
underlying structure of the corporation and agreed with Berle that man-
agers owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, not as individuals, but 
only to shareholders as a group.142 What Dodd meant by this was that it 
was not the actual interest of shareholders, but a constructed interest of 
“the shareholder,” to which management owed a duty. He argued that 
this conceptualization of shareholders required corporate managers to 
treat the corporation differently than merely an amalgamation of contrac-
tual and fiduciary obligations owed to actual and immediate sharehold-
ers. This created a space for management to find a balance between the 
optimal immediate and perpetual performance of the organization by 
serving the best interest of the corporation as a whole. 
Dodd further asserted that his suggestion was not a dramatic shift of 
perception from Berle’s understanding of the firm, for the picture was 
altered “more in form than in substance”143 because the sole function of 
the corporation (to make profit for its shareholders) remained unal-
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tered.144 But this statement was not altogether true. Although the sole 
function of the corporation was still profit-making, Dodd’s perspective 
was jamming a wedge between ownership and control, aligning mana-
gerial discretion with the best interests of the corporation rather than the 
shareholders. This opened a debate as to what was in the best interests of 
the corporation. Such ambiguity was what Berle was attempting to eradi-
cate, so as to limit managerial opportunism—at least in the interim. Dodd 
hoped that if this theoretical tweak were accepted, it would free man-
agement enough to take into consideration the interests of other stake-
holders, even at the expense of maximizing profits.145 
Dodd was aware that he was placing power into the hands of man-
agement. He argued for placing faith in management rather than share-
holders to guide the corporation, asserting that the fiduciary relationship, 
as Berle conceived it, would create a serious obstacle to achieving social-
ly responsible managers.146 He suggested that one must look to the man-
agers, not to the owners, for professionalized corporate conduct,147 for it 
was “hardly thinkable” that absentee owners, who have little or no con-
tact with their business other than collecting a dividend, would be filled 
“with a professional spirit of public service.”148 Moreover, if corporate 
managers had a duty solely to shareholders, all other stakeholders with a 
vested interest in the corporation (including employees, consumers, and 
the community) would have to find protection from corporate power 
when their interests were contrary to maximizing profits for sharehold-
ers.149 Therefore, to promote socially responsible behavior, corporate 
managers needed to be the guardians of all interests that the corporation 
affected, and this result could only happen if corporate managers were 
freed to be able to employ the corporation’s “funds in a manner appro-
priate to a person practicing a profession and imbued with a sense of so-
cial responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust.”150 
If freed from the constraints of a shareholder primacy agenda, why 
would managers use this broad discretion for the betterment of the com-
munity when they could use it to enrich themselves instead? Dodd ac-
knowledged the problem of opportunism and then stated that it was not 
the concern of his article to question “whether the voluntary acceptance 
of social responsibility by corporate managers [was] workable, but 
whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to fundamental prin-
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ciples of the law of business corporations.”151 But he tacitly contradicted 
himself by appealing to the claims of high-minded managers who es-
poused the virtue of public duty.152 He used this approach to establish 
that managers might be worthy of trust.153 
Dodd merely employed optimism for the new generation of manag-
ers who claimed to be enlightened enough to use their discretion to assist 
other stakeholders, like employees, who needed protection from the in-
equities of their bargaining positions with the corporation.154 He romanti-
cized about the potential to transform modern business from a “purely 
private matter” into a “public profession,” in which managers would un-
dertake a role as stewards of society.155 His arguments were inspiring, 
but also lacking substance, rendering them no more than corporate futur-
ism. 
But, when one considers Dodd’s broader publication record,156 it 
becomes questionable whether the suggestion that Dodd was a business 
commonwealth corporatist can stand up to scrutiny. Admittedly, Dodd’s 
argument from the 1932 article suggests that he was using the business 
commonwealth corporatists (in particular, Owen D. Young and Gerald 
Swope) as examples of professionalized corporate managers who volun-
tarily accepted a responsibility for achieving public-interest ends.157 But 
when one puts the 1932 article to one side and reviews Dodd’s other 
writings before and after the 1932 article, it becomes clearer that Dodd 
was primarily an anti-managerialist. Therefore, one can conclude that 
Dodd was merely open-minded to Young and Swope’s business com-
monwealth corporatism, adopting a wait-and-see approach to “whether 
experiences in that direction [ran] counter to fundamental principles of 
the law of business corporations.”158 
It is further submitted that Dodd sided with business common-
wealth corporatists merely because he needed examples of potentially 
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enlightened managers to counter what he believed to be Berle’s alar-
mingly extreme shareholder primacy position. In other words, Dodd did 
not use the examples of Young and Swope because he genuinely en-
dorsed their specific agenda, but merely because he was encouraged by 
their efforts, which appeared to be moving in the direction of corporate 
responsibility. Dodd’s point was that such attempts at enlightened mana-
gerial behavior would be stamped out by Berle’s strategy to bind manag-
ers to the whims of absentee profiteers. 
In sum, Dodd’s 1932 article ought to be regarded as a reaction to 
Berle’s position. The argument in this article contradicted his own best 
judgment (as established by the archive of his work).159 This is why he 
later admitted that this argument was “rash” and riddled with “legal dif-
ficulties.”160 Thus, it should be regarded more as a consequence of 
Berle’s extremism and less as a sincere endorsement of business com-
monwealth corporatism. Dodd was merely petitioning those potentially 
lured by Berle’s perceived extremism to keep an open mind and not to 
close the door on the potential for enlightened managerial behavior. And 
yet Dodd was overzealous in making this point, crossing the line of sug-
gesting the potential of other options by fully advocating managerialism 
in a rash and reactionary manner. Therefore, though the case can be 
made that Dodd advocated business commonwealth corporatism, his lev-
el of enthusiasm actually skews a more accurate understanding of what 
Dodd was doing. To be more accurate, one must emphasize that the con-
tradictory nature of Dodd’s other writings, before and after this article, 
point to the conclusion that he was not a business commonwealth corpo-
ratist.161 
D. Berle’s Reply: For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note 
One could imagine a number of ends to this story. For instance, 
Berle could have explained his position in a congenial manner, highlight-
ing the similarities of his arguments with those of Dodd and explaining 
their differences as not so dissimilar after all. But this never happened. 
Instead, Berle’s biographer explains that Berle was outraged by Dodd’s 
accusation that he was a conservative, writing: “Dodd’s real crime was 
making Berle seem like a Tory in the midst of an American revolu-
tion.”162 
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Imagine how agonizing it must have been for the sometimes pomp-
ous Berle to endure such an affront on the eve of the release of his 
crowning achievement, which was to be (by his design) his coming-out 
party into the world of the left-leaning intellectual elites of America.163 
Berle had expected a managerialist attack from conservatives, who 
would rhetorically defend the status quo ante of managerial discretion, 
but he did not expect to be accused of being a conservative. Dodd was 
probably equally surprised that Berle’s reply was left-leaning. This fami-
ly feud of the left exposed Berle’s argument as being less than ideal, 
based on the weak assumption that the interests of absentee owners 
would make management more accountable, while also exposing Dodd’s 
corporate responsibility argument as being naively trusting of corporate 
managers.164 
To address Dodd’s criticism and, more importantly, to defend his 
own reputation and exact a little revenge, Berle elaborated on his main 
thesis that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their 
interest appears.”165 He argued that the present law established that man-
agers were required to manage the corporation in the interest of its share-
holders, and that although many groups, notably labor, were gaining rec-
ognition as having claims against the corporation (which created legiti-
mate cost to industry), the recognition of these costs (which reduced 
profits) did not alter the main objective of the corporate managers.166 
Berle continued to fire back at Dodd by arguing that the “real justifica-
tion” for Dodd’s opposition to his thesis stemmed from Dodd’s underly-
ing assumption that industrial managers of the day functioned more as 
government officials than as merchants,167 which Berle tacitly (and spite-
fully) suggested was a foolhardy reason because managers did not see 
themselves as such.168 
Berle did not dispute Dodd’s suggestion that the corporation needed 
to be accountable to the wider polity.169 This concession probably 
shocked Dodd because it was a slippery slope, which opened the door to 
the primacy of the public interest over property rights. This is an argu-
ment that a clever and conservatively minded liberal, like Dodd accused 
Berle of being, would never make. After making clear his colors, Berle 
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then went on the attack, clarifying with slightly condescending under-
tones that managers did wield immense (government-like) power over 
society, but did not regard themselves as stewards of society and did not 
assume social responsibilities.170 And to make matters worse, no me-
chanism existed to enforce the applications of Dodd’s pseudo-theory of 
the corporation.171 Furthermore, if the fiduciary obligation of mangers to 
shareholders was ignored, then the management and control172 would 
become “for all practical purposes absolute”—resulting in greater corpo-
rate irresponsibility.173 Therefore, until such time as Dodd (or any others 
who sympathized with the noble manager) was prepared to offer a “clear 
and reasonable enforcement scheme of responsibilities,” emphasis would 
have to be placed on the fact that the corporation’s sole purpose was to 
make profits for their shareholders. This was because there existed no 
other legal control over corporate power, however imperfect it may be.174 
Berle emphasized that shareholder primacy was the best option available 
to take “responsibility for control of national wealth and incomes” in a 
manner that properly protected the majority of the community.175 Basi-
cally, he was chastising Dodd for being quixotic, suggesting it was time 
for him to get his head out of the clouds and see what managers were 
actually doing. 
Berle provided an echo of his corporate-liberal revolution by ar-
guing that the only way to slip public interest through the backdoor of 
what today’s observer would call corporate governance was through the 
shareholder primacy model. Berle noted that the working and middle 
classes were ever-more populating the American shareholder class and 
thus the construction of shareholder interests ought not be characterized 
as the interests of greedy profiteers, but as the interests of the average 
American. Admittedly, he does not come right out with this argument, 
but he did hint at its potential, writing: 
The administration of corporations—peculiarly, a few hundred large 
corporations—is now the crux of American industrial life. Upon the 
securities of these corporations has been erected the dominant part 
of the property system of the industrial east. A major function of 
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these securities is to provide safety, security, or means of support 
for that part of the community which is unable to earn its living in 
the normal channels of work or trade. Under cover of that system, 
certain individuals may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of 
wealth. But this is an incident to the system and not its major pre-
mise; statistically, it plays a relatively minor part. Historically, and 
as a matter of law, corporate managements have been required to 
run their affairs in the interests of their security holders.176 
In his conclusion, Berle reiterated that the law could not surrender 
the present fiduciary controls over management before a new order 
emerged, noting that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening 
periods of chaos,”177 but would only respond to new outcomes or theories 
as they were established.178 He foresaw that social theorists would guide 
the establishment of a revised institutional design of American society, 
and that at this point, the law could play a role stabilizing expectations 
and relations between stakeholders as they emerged.179 But until such a 
time, lawyers were in a position where they needed legal tools to meet 
day-to-day situations. The fiduciary duty of management to shareholders 
was presently the best legal tool they had to control corporate beha-
vior.180 And as it stood, the shareholder primacy model worked as a me-
thod to ensure public interest, if envisaged in the correct manner. 
Berle punctuated his reply to Dodd, declaring that “it is one thing to 
say that the law must allow for such developments. It is quite another to 
grant uncontrolled power to corporate managers in the hope that they 
will produce that development.”181 Berle’s bad-natured reactions aside, 
he focused his attack on what Dodd had actually attempted to accomplish 
in his article, namely weakening the fiduciary obligations of managers to 
shareholders before social theorists could rationalize the modern corpora-
tion in a manner that could be adopted by law. Berle did so because he 
thought that the application of Dodd’s argument would result in a carte 
blanche for corporate irresponsibility, and because Dodd did not appre-
ciate what Berle was attempting to accomplish with shareholder primacy. 
In sum, Berle argued clearly that shareholders’ fiduciary controls 
over management could not be abandoned by lawyers until a new order 
emerged. He noted that “legal technique [did] not contemplate interven-
ing periods of chaos,” but would only respond to new outcomes or theo-
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ries as they were established.182 Berle’s argument in the 1932 article mir-
rored the missing passages from the 1931 article (which were published 
in The Modern Corporation and Private Property). He argued that social 
science needed to better guide the legal understanding of the evolving 
corporate form and that only after this was done could the law play a role 
in the emerging new order.183 Berle emphasized that lawyers needed new 
legal tools to bring corporate behavior under greater control.184 Share-
holder primacy was the only tool available. 
E. Berle’s Reluctance in For Whom Corporate Managers Are  
Trustees: A Note 
One question may be nagging the reader at this point: Why did 
Berle not take the time to write a more thorough response to Dodd? If 
Berle had more to say about the future regulation of corporations and 
how the shareholder primacy argument was merely to be an interim solu-
tion before adoption of planners’ corporatism, why did he not present it 
in the Harvard Law Review? The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property was merely weeks away from release, and his 1932 article 
could have been a great support for the book’s launch, which Berle so 
desperately wanted to be a success. And yet, Berle was very guarded in 
his response to Dodd. A reasonable answer is that Berle was disgusted 
with the situation. He fired off a reply more as a knee-jerk emotional re-
sponse than a thoughtful clarification of his position. Another possibility 
is that he feared alienating Brandeis-style antitrust advocates. But Wil-
liam Bratton and Michael Wachter provide a more provocative alterna-
tive, which could be easily overlooked. They write: 
We suspect he thought that the timing was wrong. The battle be-
tween his progressive vision of corporatism and business common-
wealth corporatism was taking place behind closed doors. Berle 
wanted to ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would 
be adopted by the Roosevelt Administration and presumably was 
jealous to protect his influence.185 
They note that Raymond Moley, a colleague at Columbia Universi-
ty, lured Berle away from full-time academia in 1932 by convincing him 
to join Roosevelt in his bid to win the presidency.186 But the authors are 
vague as to when this offer was made, writing only: it was “early in 
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[Roosevelt’s] 1932 presidential campaign.”187 The argument calls for 
more precision. If a connection is to be established between Berle’s reply 
to Dodd and Berle’s Roosevelt years, pinpointing months matters. So to 
be more exact, Berle was aware that he would be functioning in his new 
position as a political advisor for a presidential candidate in May.188 
Dodd published his reply to Berle on May 8, 1932,189 and Berle fired 
back his reply to Dodd after that date in the following edition.190 The 
“New Individual” speech (presented about three months later), which 
was penned by Berle for Roosevelt, clearly established that corporatism 
was on Berle’s mind.191 
The “New Individual” speech argued that citizens had the right to 
have their interest in the economy protected from the irresponsible exer-
cise of corporate power, and that the government needed to protect this 
right.192 As Bratton and Wachter explained, this speech called for “gov-
ernment controls” over managerial power so that managers would be 
compelled to “assume responsibility for the public good, end their inter-
necine disputes, come together as industrial groups, and cooperate to-
ward a common end.”193 If industrial groups failed to do so, the govern-
ment would make them do so.194 
Berle understood that shareholder primacy was only one manner of 
enforcing the public interest in corporate governance. In 1932, the politi-
cal landscape was shifting. Berle believed that planners’ corporatism, 
which he endorsed in the last chapter of the Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, was possible if Roosevelt won the election and if Berle 
could convince Roosevelt to see things his way. In sum, Berle wanted to 
ensure that corporate governance could be directed to take into consider-
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ation the wider polity, and he believed that he had an opportunity to 
make this happen. 
Bratton and Wachter, however, did not get it totally right. The bat-
tle behind closed doors was not between Berle’s corporatism and busi-
ness commonwealth corporatism. The battle was actually between: 
(1) his corporatism and the new individual, and (2) Brandeis-style anti-
trust economics and the old individual.195 The champion of the latter was 
Felix Frankfurter and his acolytes, whom Berle called “the would-be 
Brandeis followers of today” who “lacked the great man’s admirable ge-
nius for being both radical and practical.”196 
The tension between Frankfurter and Berle goes back to their time 
at Harvard.197 Frankfurter joined the faculty at Harvard when Berle was 
in his first year of law school.198 Frankfurter’s biographer describes his 
chief personality imperfection in the following passage: 
Because his self-image was inflated, and because his psychological 
peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not accept se-
rious, sustained opposition in fields he considered his domain of ex-
pertise; he reacted to his opponents with vindictive hostility.199 
When one considers this idiosyncrasy in light of the following passage 
from Berle’s biographer, one begins to appreciate how a young Berle 
would be particularly irritating to Frankfurter: 
Later in life neither man cared to discuss the other, and there are on-
ly snippets of stories concerning their Harvard years. Yet, what 
emerges is an arrogant young Berle bent on cutting others down to 
size. The young Adolf relentlessly challenged Frankfurter in class, 
thereby making himself an unforgivable embarrassment to the pro-
fessor. According to William O. Douglas, later a Columbia Law 
School and New Deal colleague, in the years following Berle’s 
enrollment in Frankfurter’s course, Berle began attending it for a 
second year in a row. Frankfurter was puzzled and asked Berle if he 
had taken the course the previous year. Berle replied affirmatively 
and Frankfurter asked, “Then why are you back?” “Oh,” Berle re-
sponded, “I wanted to see if you had learned anything since last 
year.” Another story had a vengeful Frankfurter blocking the young 
Berle from making the Law Review.200 
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From one perspective, Frankfurter’s animosity was understandable. 
From another, it was not. It is difficult to image a pupil exhibiting such 
disrespect for a professor without inciting disciplinary action. But for 
Frankfurter to personally retaliate against the immature Berle (remember 
Berle started law school three or four year earlier than most students), 
thereby exhibiting transparent signs of vindictiveness to a poorly ad-
justed (yet arrogant) student might be seen as unprofessional. 
Putting this relationship into relevant context, Roosevelt strategical-
ly divided his advisors so that no one camp within his ranks enjoyed the 
position of privileged insider,201 thus creating a competitive decision-
making process. Berle and Frankfurter fit this mold because any deci-
sion-making process that involved both men could be nothing less than 
competitive. While on the campaign trail before Berle had written the 
“New Individual” speech, Roosevelt invited Frankfurter’s opinion re-
garding policy development. Berle’s biographer writes: 
Felix Frankfurter’s intrusion into the campaign [was] intolerable. 
Aside from his old personal animus to the Harvard law professor, 
Berle saw in Frankfurter an ideological adversary—a Brandeisian 
“atomist” who opposed the brain trust consensus on large economic 
units for industrial planning.202 
Berle warned Roosevelt that he should not make Frankfurter’s 
“New Freedom” speech, which was similar to what Brandeis had drafted 
for Woodrow Wilson.203 Berle thought that Brandeis-style individualism 
was what the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations used as a euphem-
ism for inaction. He argued, “Whatever the economic system does per-
mit, it is not individualism.”204 He then advised Roosevelt: 
[I]t is necessary to do for [the American] system what Bismarck did 
for the German system in 1880, as [a] result of conditions not unlike 
these . . . . Otherwise only one of two results can occur. Either [the] 
handful of people who run the economic system now will get to-
gether making an economic government which far outweighs in im-
portance the federal government; or in their struggles they will tear 
the system to pieces. Neither alternative is sound national policy.205 
Berle pressured Roosevelt to make a “pronouncement” arguing for 
“public collective planning.”206 Berle suggested to Roosevelt that this 
pronouncement “would probably make at once [Roosevelt’s] place in 
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history and [have] political significance vastly beyond the significance of 
[his] campaign.”207 Five weeks later, Roosevelt gave the “New Indivi-
dualism” speech, which Berle named in order to contrast Frankfurter’s 
old freedom mantra and to make the statement that he had counter-
manded Frankfurter’s attempts to make individualism a core principle of 
the campaign.208 
The antipathy between Berle and Frankfurter helps explain why 
Berle did not defend his ideas as strongly as he could have against Dodd. 
Indeed, the timing was wrong. But the battle was not between his corpo-
ratism and business commonwealth corporatism, it was between his vi-
sion and Frankfurter’s vision. As far as the business commonwealth cor-
poratism model, no evidence exists that Frankfurter, or others in the 
democratic camp, directly advocated it. Furthermore, Berle did want, as 
Bratton and Wachter put it, “to ensure his vision of corporatism was the 
one that would be adopted by the Roosevelt Administration.”209 He “was 
jealous to protect his influence,”210 but not from his few members of the 
brain trust at the time (Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and James Warburg), 
rather from his old nemesis—Felix Frankfurter. 
From the outset of joining Roosevelt’s campaign, Berle would 
probably have known that Frankfurter had been informally advising 
Roosevelt from the time that Roosevelt was Governor of New York 
State,211 and that at some point Frankfurter would be called in to assume 
a similar role during this campaign. Furthermore, Frankfurter was Bran-
deis’s protégé, and Berle knew the ideological connection between 
Frankfurter and Brandeis.212 So Berle, being a former student of Frank-
furter and a young lawyer for a year at Brandeis’s law firm, would have 
known that a battle was coming. He also would have known the position 
that Frankfurter would be espousing to Roosevelt. Here, Berle had an 
advantage because he knew Frankfurter’s plan of action, but Frankfurter 
was blind to Berle’s. Berle’s biographer sets the scene in the following 
passage: 
Both men were anxious to succeed and there developed between 
them a strong animus that would ripen into the bitterest and most 
ideological of New Deal rivalries . . . the issue between them being 
whether the antitrust laws should be used to break up big corpora-
tions and restore the competition [Frankfurter’s view] or whether 
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big corporations were the products of natural economic forces and 
should be controlled through federal regulation [Berle’s view].213 
Berle would have appreciated that he had an ace up his sleeve, be-
ing that his planners’ corporatism pitch to Roosevelt was unknown to 
Frankfurter. It is easy to imagine Berle wanting to write a much different 
reply to Dodd, outlining planners’ corporatism, but Berle had not won 
the ideological struggle with Frankfurter by the time that Berle fired back 
his reply to Dodd.214 Berle must have felt that it was too risky to reveal 
his position in the Harvard Law Review (Frankfurter’s backyard). Berle 
could have foreseen the “vindictive” Frankfurter not only being aware of, 
but also enjoying, Dodd’s reply to Berle on the eve of the much-
anticipated release of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
Berle must have figured that publishing a full disclosure to Frankfurter of 
how he would advise Roosevelt in the coming months would not be 
worth the possibility of Frankfurter winning the opinion of Roosevelt on 
this issue at such a critically sensitive moment in American history. Hav-
ing a hand in the future course of American society at a time when it was 
on the verge of economic collapse raised the stakes so high that Berle 
had to play his cards close to his chest. 
F. A Final Word From Berle and Dodd 
In the end, Dodd rejected his original arguments from the debate. In 
a 1942 book review, Dodd expressed regret for taking the position that 
he did in the debate, reflecting: 
I was rash enough to suggest that our law of business corpora-
tions . . . might develop a broader view which would make the 
proposition that corporate managers are, to some extent, trustees for 
labor and for the consumer more than meaningless rhetoric. The le-
gal difficulties which were involved were clear enough, as Mr. 
A. A. Berle was quick to point out.215 
On the other hand, Berle never made such a concession.216 Even 
when confronted by contemporaries for his apparent shift in opinion 
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without sufficient explanation,217 he denied he ever made concessions—
claiming that others misunderstood his writing.218 Hopefully, revisiting 
the Berle–Dodd debate has clarified Berle’s position, rectifying the long-
held misunderstanding of his shareholder primacy argument. 
V. THE RISE OF FINANCE, BERLE, AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
A. Commoditization, Financialization, and Society 
Commoditization means to treat something as though it were a 
product that could be bought and sold. Karl Polanyi’s The Great Trans-
formation tells the story of a critical point in the commoditization of 
English society.219 It describes how starved peasant farmers were evicted 
from land that was communally used for generations and then were 
forced to accept harsh factory work. In other words, Polanyi explains the 
result of transforming the natural environment and the traditional ways of 
life of a people into commodities (property and labor)220 and harnessing 
these commodities to the price mechanism in order to violently create a 
new social order.221 Although Polanyi regarded this social experiment as 
a “stark utopia,”222 others disagreed, arguing that it was an essential step 
in the birth of modern society.223 
The financialization of society has much in common with this story 
of The Great Transformation. Financialization is an evolution of the 
commoditization process that Polanyi contemplated. Financialization 
holds great potential benefits for society by dispersing risk throughout 
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society; however, it is also dangerous because it makes society more 
complex to manage by creating layers of interconnected markets for 
commodities. Maybe the best example of such financialization is the op-
eration of derivatives. As Don Chance and Robert Brooks explain: 
Derivatives are financial instruments whose returns are derived 
from those of other financial instruments. That is, their performance 
depends on how other financial instruments perform. Derivatives 
serve a valuable purpose in providing a means of managing finan-
cial risk. By using derivatives, companies and individuals can trans-
fer, for a price, any undesired risk to other parties who either have 
risks that offset or want to assume that risk.224 
In other words, derivatives are exchangeable instruments whose value 
depends on the future fate of an underlying commodity. Assessing 
whether the risk of holding a derivative is increasing or decreasing will 
determine its value. The result is that risk can be allocated to those who 
are in the best position to assume it. 
To better appreciate why one might be concerned over the “rise of 
finance” or financialization,225 one may imagine two worlds: the market 
world and the social world. The social world is that of everyday life. The 
market world is the complex array of rules that affects the buying and 
selling of commodities, derivatives, and other exchangeable instruments. 
It is an intangible world of information and transactions, which causes 
changes in how individuals understand risk and reward when making 
decisions, for example, how collateralized debt obligations and their as-
sessment by credit rating agencies shifted the risk and reward for those 
that offered mortgages to clients.226 This is a politically contentious sto-
ry,227 demonstrating how financialization creates social complexity by 
manufacturing new risks.228 Regulators did not identify these manufac-
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tured risks in time,229 resulting in serious social and economic conse-
quences that will have a dramatic impact on the everyday lives of many 
people for years to come. 
B. Three Causes of The Social Blindness of Investing 
The “rise of finance” suggests that investor empowerment is evolv-
ing into a new and powerful layer of global governance that may not 
adequately meet social needs.230 It is fair to say that this observation may 
be justified, as there is good reason to believe that investors are largely 
blinded to how their choices affect the social world. Three potential 
causes of this blindness follow. 
First, with the greater consolidation of the investment banking in-
dustry since 2008, governments cannot allow banks to fail and thus the 
public purse is the de facto underwriter of risk within the banking indus-
try.231 Some hold out hope that the Dodd-Frank Act can properly reallo-
cate risk within the banking sector, but until it does so, this risk remains a 
serious concern. Being shielded from failure, banks become immune to 
the new risks they manufacture.232 This is a dangerous situation,233 en-
couraging the creation of complex financial instruments with uninhibited 
ambition to create wealth. It is questionable whether adequate incentive 
structures234 are in place to ensure that those at the highest echelons of 
finance will be mindful of the impact that their decisions may have on 
the social world. 
Second, innovations in capital-asset pricing models235 and the ma-
turing of algorithmic strategies236 encourage investors to consider their 
investments within the framing of risk-return ratios on investments.237 
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Such specialized information presents investment options as though they 
were in a vacuum, divorced from their consequences in the social world. 
In other words, financial information is coded in an abstracted language 
that solely focuses on investment consequences. As a result, investors are 
rarely informed or reminded of the social implications of their invest-
ment choices. 
Third, disregard for social consequences has been observed, tole-
rated, and even rewarded within the market world. For example, institu-
tional investors “rent seek” at the expense of the long-term value of the 
corporation and society.238 If such destructive behavior can be estab-
lished as having a pattern, then the sensible conclusion is that investors 
have too much discretion, and thus, the rise of finance as a governance 
tool must be more closely regulated.239 But even if the political will ex-
isted, such regulation might spark massive global market disruptions and 
even further failures at a time when the global economy is less than sta-
ble. 
C. Some Questions and Answers on Berle’s Shareholder Primacy 
and Today’s Rise of Finance 
Can corporate legal scholarship contribute to a better understanding 
of financialization? On one hand, stocks are different from other exchan-
geable instruments in the sense that only shares have rights attached to 
them that grant shareholders power within corporate governance.240 Yet 
many shareholders treat stocks much the same as they would other ex-
changeable instruments: “buy, hope, hold, and cash in.”241 In other 
words, they do not participate in corporate governance directly. As with 
financialization, the existence of stocks creates two worlds: the market 
world (stock markets) and the social world (the corporation’s social rela-
tionship242 or “nexus of contracts”243). For these reasons, events in corpo-
rate governance that are affected by stock price and passive investors are 
comparable to the phenomena of financialization. 
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Do Berle’s thoughts provide insight on today’s financialization? 
The answer is yes, but in considering today’s political economy, Berle 
would likely want to revisit three of his more antiquated positions. 
First is that government was capable of determining the course of 
the economy and that it could enforce this course.244 Modern governance 
theory sinks this argument.245 And yet, Berle believed in a responsible 
exercise of private economic power in harmony with public authority, 
which carried with it the implicit understanding that government would 
step in to protect the public interest as a measure of last resort.246 In prin-
ciple, this is not so far from what regulatory capitalism is attempting to 
do today.247 
Second is that a new theory would resolve the public–private ten-
sion trapped within corporate theory.248 One could argue that Bratton and 
Millon have made short work of the argument that a theory could have 
such influence.249 But upon further inspection, it may not be a theory of 
the firm that resolves this public–private tension, since the “private” cor-
poration will soon be crossing the Rubicon.250 As will be explained be-
low, there are ever-more frequent examples of the “private” corporation 
adopting roles once reserved for the very “public” welfare state, causing 
what Braithwaite calls the “reality of hybridity between the privatization 
of the public and publicization of the private.”251 
Third is that Berle argued that when a theoretical model of the cor-
poration emerged, it would reject classical economic theory and might 
make the property theory of corporations obsolete.252 To date, the winner 
of the race for a better theoretical model of the corporation appears to be 
Oliver Williamson and his theory of markets, networks, and hierarchies 
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(New Institutional Economic Theory).253 Williamson’s work is derived 
from classical economic theory and is based on the cost of exchanging 
property (transaction cost theory).254 Berle would certainly adjust his ar-
guments to compensate for the realities of the modern corporation and 
governance today, but as suggested, at least in some cases, the adjust-
ment need not be that drastic. 
Taking into account Berle’s body of work covered in this Article 
from 1921 to 1932, it can be concluded that he argued that the sharehold-
er class needed to provide something more to the corporation and society 
than merely creating passive investors.255 He envisioned three different 
ways that the shareholder class could be legitimatized: first, by being a 
mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of profits and power to la-
bor;256 second, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of 
profits and power to the broader American population;257 and third, by 
attracting sophisticated business expertise that could take an active and 
constructive role in managing the corporation toward the creation of a 
wealthier and more stable society.258 Assuming that the shareholder class 
was legitimatized, he argued that “all powers granted to a corporation 
[ought to be] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all 
the shareholders as their interest appears”259 without qualification. But 
Berle did not have complete faith in its legitimacy, admitting that it was a 
less than fully satisfying interim measure to help eliminate the democrat-
ic deficit within the American economy.260 
Would Berle still endorse shareholder primacy today? The answer 
is probably not. Consider the three different ways that he believed the 
shareholder class could legitimatize their position within corporate go-
vernance. The first was the emancipation of labor through worker control 
of the shareholder class. This never happened and is only realizable in 
one’s imagination today.261 
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The second was the egalitarian distribution of profits and power 
within the corporation through broader shareholder distribution. Today, 
the middle- and lower-wage workers that invest in shares generally do so 
through institutional investors (pension funds and mutual funds). These 
individuals have contracted away their rights, allowing that institutional 
investors can participate in corporate governance on their behalf with 
few exceptions.262 In terms of profit, what these “shareholders” gain 
through such investments, they may be losing through pension privatiza-
tion.263 Thus, the egalitarian distribution of profits and power has not 
lived up to Berle’s high hopes. 
The third can be posed as a question: Can today’s greater share-
holder empowerment lead to the sort of active and constructive roles for 
management that Berle had in mind? In other words, can good decisions 
in the financial world translate into good decisions in the social world? 
The answer to this question is less than clear and invites debate. Yet, this 
tension is healthy264 because private entrepreneurs and public lawmakers 
need to be reminded that the gaps between markets and society must be 
bridged as they create the new hybrid regulatory mechanisms of tomor-
row.265 
D. The Hybrid Regulatory Mechanisms of Tomorrow: 
Bridging the Gaps Between Markets and Society 
The privatization of public services266 and the use of meta-
regulation267 demonstrate how governments have placed the day-to-day 
regulation of public interest in the hands of private actors. Business rea-
dily accepts these government gifts when they are granted, and rightly 
so. Business wants the profits from managing segments of the public sec-
tor. It also wants to self-regulate in order to achieve flexibility and a 
competitive edge. At the same time, investors want to capitalize on a full 
menu of investment opportunities that are only limited by the capacity of 
the imagination of the financial engineers of Wall Street and the Square 
Mile. 
These private actors may soon learn that there is a darker side to 
privatization and financialization. Private actors and governments are 
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blurring the line between government responsibility and private free-
doms. This blurring of traditional roles is shifting some of the underlying 
assumptions about how society ought to be governed. Letting markets 
regulate society was supposed to fix the problems of political organiza-
tion by removing government from governance.268 But when the power 
of the market is unleashed, it can create as much vice as virtue.269 Thus, 
the shift to the market may have solved some problems of political or-
ganization, but as the credit crisis demonstrated, it has also created new 
problems of market organization. 
The problems associated with social organization, whether political 
or market based, will never go away. The shift to the market has resulted 
in two things. One is a transfer of power from the state to private actors. 
The other is confusion over whether public or private actors are respon-
sible for areas in which there have been these transfers of power. As 
governments scramble to get away from welfare state obligations, inves-
tors and business actors gamble that they will be able to profit from these 
traditional areas of public interest without attracting greater social re-
sponsibilities. But a sober look at what is occurring today leads one to 
believe that this gamble is a bad bet for private interests in the long term. 
Fundamental changes in the public–private distinction are occurring, and 
private actors are being lured into a precarious situation. 
What is this precarious situation? It is the circumstances in which 
private actors may find themselves if there is a swing in public opinion. 
To explain, Polanyi argued that there is a “double movement” within 
society in which people eventually refuse to tolerate the market over-
whelming other social needs.270 Simon Deakin has emphasized the oppo-
site side of the “double movement.” He explains that when social needs 
overwhelm the needs of the market, then there is a backlash from busi-
ness interests.271 If this “double movement” exists, then there will be a 
constant tension between favoring the needs of markets and the needs of 
society. According to Deakin, the pendulum is now swinging toward the 
needs of markets,272 but if Polanyi is correct, this shift will not be perma-
nent. 
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As these swings occur, New Institutional Economics suggests that 
institutions and organizations will not remain the same, but will evolve in 
correspondence with these swings.273 As the pendulum’s weight swings, 
the pendulum’s pivot shifts as well, thus the weight never returns to pre-
cisely the same point. In other words, if Polanyi’s “double movement” is 
right again (as it was in 1944), and the primacy of the political over the 
economic is once again restored, there will be no welfare state welcom-
ing the swing back, nor will there be a classic twentieth-century public–
private divide to protect the interest of capital. What is unnerving about 
this precarious situation is that the permutations of how it could be mis-
managed dramatically dwarf the potential productive ways it could be 
managed. One thing is for certain: the smaller the gap between the needs 
of markets and the needs of society, the easier it will be for the swing to 
be managed prudently. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it is suggested that a more robust dialectic about the pros 
and cons of the rise of finance is needed in order to properly deal with 
the present developments and their potential impacts on markets and so-
ciety. Furthermore, it is suggested that Berle’s insights into the possibili-
ties for, and limitations of, shareholder primacy offer a starting point for 
a more nuanced conversation about how today’s investors can attempt to 
meet the challenges of governance in a manner that protects both their 
own interests and the interests of society. 
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